Introduction
Life is difficult, never the same, always challenging acquired patterns of behavior and expectation. Improvisatory acts in everyday life are the result of unexpected situations, where the encounter between self and environment suddenly disrupts the banal rituals of life. Over time, experience and knowledge teach us ways to cope with unexpectedness, and to improvise.
In music, improvisation is often a matter of choice. The unexpected situation is created, set up, purposively leading to an improvisatory encounter between body and environment. The musician knows he/she will improvise in the next hour. But it can also resemble life, by way of sudden unexpected moments which even the musicians did not anticipate. Experience and expertise enhance the fluidity of improvisational acts in the arts.
In this article, I explore, as a musician and a human being, these tensions between improvisation in everyday life and in the arts: between urgent action and play, between determined and created situations. The first part examines the different reactions of gods, heroes, and humans towards unexpected situations. In the second part I unravel the different appearances of unexpectedness, going from expected unexpectedness to unexpected unexpectedness. Thirdly, in the section "Improvisation is of a responsive order: habits, tactics, and bricolage," I consider the unfolding of unexpected events and discuss how these require some kind of "improvisatory" response in the moment of the now, the kairos. The fourth part inquires into improvisation as a method or skill developed by artists and musicians: the acquisition of an expert habitus inside a community of improvisers. The text ends with a reflection upon the capacity for the development of improvisational skills both in life and in art.
About control, bravery, and banality
Contingency in the world invites human initiative again and again. Moreover, contingent situations open up an infinite number of possibilities, each with unpredictable outcomes. The multiplicity and unpredictability of situations and trajectories in which humans are entangled by their sheer existence defy the simple lives of gods and heroes.
Gods' lives are boring, predictable, defined by themselves: no surprise, no risk, no complexity. A god decides in advance and knows all the outcomes and their eventual impact; he plays safe. He is in control of everything.
In contrast, heroes face danger and risk; their roles demand deep commitment and stubborn bravery. But the hero's trajectory is one-dimensional. The expectation is clear: that one holy grail is the aim of all difficult endeavours. The path towards it will be harsh, but the hero knows what is expected and what he wants to realize. He will meet the end of that one difficult but clear track through courage, audacity, and success. Heroic forces are part of his agency. Withdrawal, failure, or death are not options, as these are alien to the notion of hero.
Humans rarely know in advance what will happen. They know even less the consequences of events or the impact of their actions on these events. They have to cope with all possible shades of grey in between black and white, and enter a relentless openness of possibilities, each choice opening up a new horizon of possibilities and closing other horizons. They are somewhere on a blurred map full of rhizomatic trajectories and without a clear direction. But the map is always shifting. Each move implies that parts disappear and others appear, so that in each situation a human can make only one choice at a time and can never return to the crossroad where he/she had been a moment ago. Each choice is irreversible. Not choosing is also irreversible. Most human contexts and events do not imply heroic action, but consist of banal situations that nonetheless lead to enjoyable, painful, boring, or interesting developments, depending upon choices and circumstances. Everyday life for the main part consists of small, mostly unnoticed, actions, choices, and commitments, engendering small failures or successes, or simply realizing the status quo. Frequently, humans need to be heroes in small events, and less often in big events.
Improvisation is manifestly different for these three kinds of performers.
Gods cannot know what improvisation is. They invent the game, the scenario, the decisions in relation to constraints, the rules, the materials, and the time of play. It is a game they are in control of and it is reversible. Decisions can be reconsidered; if gods do not like the game or do not agree with the rules, they can change these whenever they want, without disastrous consequences. If they experiment, it is without risk. Gods are creators, not improvisers. As Pierre Aubenque writes:
[The] gods are not just, nor courageous, nor liberal, nor temperate, because they do not live in a world where they have to sign contracts, confront dangers, distribute money or moderate desires. Gods do not live in a world of relationships, of adventure and of need […] (Les dieux ne sont ni justes, ni courageux, ni libéraux, ni tempérants, car ils ne vivent pas dans un monde où l'on ait à signer des contrats, à affronter des dangers, à distribuer des sommes d'argent ou à modérer ses désirs. Les dieux ne vivent pas dans le monde de la relation, de l'aventure et du besoin [...] ). (65) For heroes, the game is hard, but playing it to the end is rewarding. All improvisation is related to the track that has been set up. The beginning and end of the scenario is more or less fixed. Nevertheless, while the rules have to be discovered and followed, the hero will encounter unpredictable situations inside the scenario-and he knows that he will. He can temporarily lose the path and become confused by unexpected happenings. High risk and danger are always part of his improvisatory moves. Hence, in the heroic scenario, all improvisation is always improvisation with a big "I" as the improvisational settings always appeal to the bravery and obstinacy of the hero. Character, decision, and perseverance are the keys to success, and the success of that one long trajectoryfinding the holy grail-ends the scenario, and as such also all further improvisation.
And human beings in all this? They have to be improvisers by dint of sheer existence. They have to improvise in ordinary and original circumstances, in successful and unsuccessful settings, on risky and banal occasions, in good and bad situations. They have to improvise all their way through their lives, even when they think a routine is settled and structures are defined, because the complexity of nature and culture, of individuals and societies, of time and space, will again and again invade and disrupt experience and expectation. 1 The reflection upon the act of improvisation in these three different worlds offers an initial approach to what improvisatory action, from everyday life to artistic performance, can mean. Tensions between urgent action and play, loss of control and the influences of choice, ethics and aesthetics, in everyday life and in making art, will be explored in the following text. As gods do not recognize unexpectedness, and annihilate improvisation with their powers of prediction and control, we will leave them here.
If we want to understand improvisation and unravel the relationships between unexpectedness or unpredictability and improvisatory intervention, we must first explore the notion of unexpectedness. Unexpectedness is part of our life world, part of the human condition; 2 it is a precondition for improvisational acts and interventions. When an object of any kind, which has been for some time expected and foreseen, presents itself, whatever be the emotion which it is by nature fitted to excite, the mind must have been prepared for it, and must even in some measure have conceived it before-hand; because the idea of the object having been so long present to it, must have before-hand excited some degree of the same emotion which the object itself would excite: the change, therefore, which its presence produces comes thus to be less considerable, and the emotion or passion which it excites glides gradually and easily into the heart, without violence, pain, or difficulty. (34) This encounter with life seems easy, and peaceful, but a bit boring.
Reflections on unexpectedness
Ten minutes of a predictable and organized morning tell me something different. But the contrary of all this happens when the object is unexpected; the passion is then poured in all at once upon the heart, which is thrown, if it is a strong passion, into the most violent and convulsive emotions, such as sometimes cause immediate death; sometimes, by the suddenness of the extacy, so entirely disjoint the whole frame of the imagination, that it never after returns to its former tone and composure, but falls either into a frenzy or habitual lunacy; and such as almost always occasion a momentary loss of reason, or of that attention to other things which our situation or our duty requires.
The personal experience described earlier (intermezzo 1) forces me to rewrite the paragraph above.
Life is unpredictable in all its details. Whatever rules and patterns are defined in advance, unplanned moments arise in the middle of unfulfillable expectation. We never really know if events will actually occur as expected, because planned structures are easily blown away by even small, unintended details and interruptions of timeand space-related actions, subjects and objects. And we definitively cannot force the world or others to be more predictable, however much we would like to.
The two examples, both in Smith's and in my words, refer to a deep opposition in kinds of events and their impact on human action and emotion. These examples are at opposite ends of a gradation between the expected and the unexpected.
The etymological origins of "expectation" lie in the Latin expectationem, meaning "anticipation, an awaiting"; the verb "expect" originates in the Latin expectare, meaning "await, look out for, desire, hope," and this in turn comes from ex-("thoroughly") and spectare ("to look"). Think of a pair of spectacles through which we see. "Unexpected" then refers to a negation of these meanings. Other words for "unexpected" are "unpredictable" and "unforeseeable"; all relate to a loss of perceptual interpretation, understanding, or control, and further refer to a loss of cognitive and conceptual insight or pre-vision.
Formally, we could try to define (un)expectedness as a relation between an item or event "i" and a set of beliefs "B" of an agent "a." Unexpectedness can be considered as the distance "d" between the occurring item "i" and the set of beliefs of "a," named by "Ba":
This set of beliefs contains the tacit and explicit, passive and active knowledge of an agent of how the world, both objects and subjects in processes, behaves. When there is a correspondence between what happens (an item or event in a situation) and the set of beliefs, the item is part of the set of beliefs and there will be no distance. The greater the difference between what happens and the background set of beliefs corresponding to that kind of situation, the more unexpected the event.
Important, too, is that the set of beliefs functions in a situational way. Human beings do not rely continually upon their total knowledge of events and facts, but on situated knowledge, related to time and space: that knowledge which is relevant to the situation. For example, humans know that earthquakes exist, but as a Belgian citizen, I do not expect to experience a big earthquake in Brussels, because of my general scientific knowledge as well as my understanding of the specifics of the Belgian geological situation. If suddenly my house gets destroyed by an earthquake, this event will be miles away from my set of beliefs concerning that specific situation. If I lived in Japan, I would know that an earthquake is more likely.
My formula for unexpectedness should thus be further refined as the distance "d" between the occurring item "i" and the set of beliefs of "a" normally prevailing in the situation where "i" occurs, "(si)", named by "Ba(si)":
As such, unexpectedness is relative to the set of beliefs which normally inform a specific situation.
At one side of the scale we can find total expectedness, at the other side extreme unexpectedness. Extreme unexpectedness is something which happens rarely, and if it happens it is often due to lack of experiential, cultural, and scientific knowledge, or to a catastrophic event. The same is true for total expectedness: situations always slightly differ. I would experience unexpectedness due to lack of information if, for example, I went to a bus stop and found that it had been moved due to road works. A quite radical unexpectedness would be to find myself suddenly floating in this world, due to changing gravity and weightlessness.
Total expectedness ----------------------------Extreme unexpectedness
However, these examples reveal other levels concerning the quality of unexpectedness, as the following explanation will reveal. The relativity of unexpectedness depends upon a diversity of situations, going from "expected unexpectedness" to "unexpected unexpectedness" to "unexpectable unexpectedness."
"Expected unexpectedness" pertains to situations where you expect to encounter unforeseeable elements. For example, you are invited to a birthday party for somebody you have not had contact with for years. Going to that party, you anticipate that you will encounter people you do not know, or talk about topics you can't imagine in advance. This kind of situation can give you a lot of stress beforehand, as you know that not everything is under control. At the same time, you sense that something interesting, thrilling, or exciting could happen. We can call this "situation-related" potentiality; some situations or setups imply partly unexpected outcomes. As we grow to adulthood, we learn to anticipate such "unexpected" situations, and to expect the kind of unexpectedness they can offer.
In an "unexpected unexpected" situation, the unforeseen is not anticipated, even if it is known to be possible. It is, for example, possible that you get involved in a sudden road accident, but normally, driving a car, you don't reflect upon those possibilities if you consider yourself a safe driver. "Unexpected unexpectedness" concerns these events which are potentially possible, but normally not part of such a situation. We can call these also "contingency-related" potentialities.
Thirdly, there are "unexpectable unexpected" events, which confound all experiential, cultural, and scientific knowledge and belief systems-for example, if the laws of earth's gravity were to suddenly change. It is not only unforeseen, but unforeseeable, and even considered impossible. This last category is close to the imaginary world, where all impossibles still have a place to exist. Thrillers often play with this kind of unpredictability. These are imaginative or extreme potentialities; they possess imaginative power but are, in general, beyond what can be considered conceivable in the world.
These three categories are not hermetically closed. Some situations are at the borders of, or can move between, the categories: between situation-related and contingency-related potentialities, or between contingency-related and extreme potentialities. Unexpectable unexpectedness can evolve into unexpected unexpectedness, as some patients with AIDS have proved. In rare cases, the disease disappears-that which was previously totally unexpectable has become highly unexpected (Rosenberg) . Still another differentiation can be made concerning the impact-here called "quantity"-of unexpectedness. The quantity of unexpectedness in relation to the agent can differ, ranging from a small unpredictable item in a situation-a secondary unexpected item-to a situation that is totally disturbing-a primary unexpected event.
Levels of unexpectedness
The impact upon the agent in primary unexpected situations is high and there is no way to escape, while secondary unexpected items are rather unimportant and can possibly be ignored without much interference.
The quantity of unexpectedness in relation to the agent can also be very variable on a qualitative level, ranging from positive unpredictability or serendipity-happy unexpected events-to negative events or catastrophe, including dramatic or life-risking situations with possible fatal outcomes.
These quantitative and qualitative polarities can be set out on an X-Y axis, where X is the qualitative graduation from negative to positive unpredictability, and Y informs us of the importance, from secondary to primary unexpectedness. If quality and quantity are both significant, the unexpected situation can have an important positive impact upon the agent's life. If both are low, some temporarily unpleasant event, or part of an event will happen. While an unexpected situation can be inherently negative, e.g. encountering a burglar in your house, the reaction of the participants to the event can force the outcome of that situation towards a more negative or positive outcome. The next picture shows a possible frame of unexpected events.
While humans cope with a whole range of possible impacts of unexpected events from banal to thrilling, highimpact situations are the fate of heroes. The hero knows that he will encounter high-level unexpected situations with life-threatening elements. We drove the sharp end of the beam into the monster's eye […] We ran away in a fright, but he plucked the beam all besmirched with gore from his eye, and hurled it from him in a frenzy of rage and pain, shouting as he did so to the other Cyclopes who lived on the bleak headlands near him […] "What ails you, Polyphemus," said they, "that you make such a noise, breaking the stillness of the night, and preventing us from being able to sleep?" But Polyphemus shouted to them from inside the cave, "Noman is killing me by fraud! Noman is killing me by force!" (Homer, The Odyssey 9.347-9.407)
Life evolves as an improvisatory dialogue between agents and environments. Most of the time, we know the rules of a dialogue, its syntax, and its materials. We have a certain vocabulary, but we never know in advance how the dialogue will evolve exactly. This dialogical nature involves a negotiation of unexpected interruption and alteration of daily activities, often small but present. Interaction and reaction both of ourselves and of the environment, objects, events, others, are an intrinsic part of the evolving situation and of the ongoing process of life.
How can we not to improvise? We cannot negate our human condition; we are part of the social and natural environment, of that constant flux of objects and subjects, of the multiplicity of spaces and times, and of the interdependent or interacting movements of all constituents in every situation. Human beings undergo, as well as cause, distortions of expected or regular frameworks. All agents, objects or subjects, respond along possible lines and patterns, allowing for small variations depending upon the situational context and their own position. Humans respond along known lines, known scenes, relying upon their belief systems and action patterns, although each time somewhat differently, negotiating the event with the other agents, be they objects or subjects, and blurring in their intervention anticipated and unanticipated responses.
An unexpected item triggers a chain of events in a situation, starting from an initial equilibrium, then entering a phase of complication, or unexpectedness, and followed by possible interaction-you can react or not in unexpected situation-and working towards a provisionally "resolved" ending (Jean 61 The end situation reveals a re-equilibrium, a different state of equilibrium, which possibly can be the start again for another chain of events with unexpectedness: "The thief finally got off." As in a dialogue, no direction can be ascertained in advance. Circumstances and mutual responses intervene with one's own choice and reaction.
Such a chain of events disturbs the permanence of structures, of equilibrium, causing disequilibrium and possibly leading to the emergence of the new. Improvisation, like dialogue, is time-dependent and space-dependent: it happens in the now and it happens here. In situations of unexpected unexpectedness, neither the "now" nor the "here" of the situation is known in advance; neither is it possible to grasp in that time-space frame its whole relationship with other time or other space.
However, humans try to respond to such challenges with their own sets of beliefs and action patterns. Bourdieu's notion of habitus and his theory of the logic of practice offer a possible answer to the dichotomy between the permanence of structures and the emergence of the new. A habitus is a disposition acquired through socialisation processes. Structured by these processes, it in turn structures future actions, as it generates principles and organizational schemes of practice and representations. A habitus structures actions and expressions, and offers permanent perception-, thought-, or action-schemes-things to do or not to do, to say or not to say in the face of probable situations (Bourdieu, SP 89) . Habitus offers a strong inclination "to favour experiences likely to reinforce it [...] to protect itself from crises and critical challenges by providing itself with a milieu to which it is as pre-adapted as possible" (Bourdieu, LP 61) . However habitus is not fixed, but a flexible tool kit which we acquire through experience, and have-often implicitly-at our side. We could even consider that experience-and by implication, also habitus-can increase the possibilities for improvisation, as we apply certain practices from certain domains to other domains, "improvising" as it is. Habitual patterns are thus extended by re-combinations, new forms or content, weaving together old patterns with actions that have never previously been tried.
As such, experiential knowledge and acquired codes and attitudes offer a guide, although an incomplete one for interaction. Humans often need to respond in the now, putting agency before deep reflection, and engage with an immediate deciphering of a situation. They need to scan the immediate: what information is present, how to decipher the codes out of a range of possible actions, which will eventually offer a cue to what is to be done or what can be done? The singularity of each situation, of each agent, object or subject, and of each time-space frame, opens a field of potentialities and necessitates a dialogue. One's responses, while being directed to acquire a certain amount of control and expectation, can lead again to unanticipated reactions from the environment. Therefore, all improvisatory actions, small or big, are subject to the inherent fragility of intervention and negotiation.
Invention and intervention in spontaneous everyday situations are constrained on two levels of interaction: by materials and by techniques. Attempts to resolve the situation require both bricolage or assemblage of the available materials, agents, qualities, and quantities at hand, as well as transformation of techniques and experiences, the kinds of action to undertake.
Firstly, as these kinds of situations have to be responded to "in the moment," humans have to work with what is "at hand," what is concrete in the "here" and "now." Context-bounded, framed as they are-i.e. embedded in a specific environment with specific agents-the materials, conditions, and possibilities of action are limited. There is neither time nor place to withdraw, reflect, invent, and come up with external means-material or conceptualother than those in or near to the event. In The Savage Mind, Claude Lévi-Strauss refers to two ways of action and thought patterns that have an impact on creativity and response in life: that of the bricoleur and that of the engineer. The bricoleur has to find a solution in very diverse concrete situations, using limited materials and having limited knowledge of them:
The "bricoleur" is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks [...] His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to make do with "whatever is at hand", that is to say with a set of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous [...] The set of the "bricoleur's" means [...] is to be defined only by its potential use. (11) The bricoleur has to be creative with what is at hand in the concrete situation. The engineer will concentrate on specifically defined aims, search for the right materials to fulfill these aims, and develop the necessary knowledge to carry out the future project. All action in the now is not urgent, nor per se limited to the "here" and the "now"; there is time and space to foresee, to plan, organize, to map out. What is not done today can be part of tomorrow's actions: "The engineer is always trying to make his way out of and go beyond the constraints imposed by a particular state of civilization while the "bricoleur" by inclination or necessity always remains within them" (13).
We should acknowledge that Claude Lévi-Strauss considers this dichotomy in a much broader framework of different ways in which societies behave, categorize, and organize, but he offers an interesting insight into how material can be considered in different action patterns in time and space.
Secondly, the moment that expected interrelated processes of objects or subjects break down, the usual ways of constructing or re-assembling things will not work. The relation between constituent elements-both objects and subjects-is temporarily out of control because of perturbations, disappointments, collisions, strokes of fate, failures, bad or just boring accounts of life. Humans have to come to grips with contradictions and engage in nonhabitual ways, trying to resolve unknown relations of order and disorder, expectation and surprise. They have to use tactics, in de Certeau's sense: rapid interventional ways of coping with the imposed, the unescapable, that which "happens" to us, presents itself and interferes with our life-from the small event ("oh no, not this now!") to the catastrophic ("why did this happen to me?"). Involuntarily moved by something problematic, unfamiliar, alien, or unexpected, humans want to "go on with life," but not in a passive way or in an "everything goes" manner. Tactics are ways to intervene, to impose temporarily one's own vocabulary, to gain some advantage or to find some solution, to have a voice. We have no time to elaborate complex strategies or to analyze the whole picture of a situation, the before, the now, and the future. Tactics act in the now and in the everyday. They are used as inventive ways to cope with situations of discontinuity or loss of control. As such they are inherently improvisational. They are attempts, ventures, spontaneous responses for regaining a meaningful situation, for escaping the horror of unexpected immobility and for remaining an integral partner and participant in one's environmental network.
The tactics used are dependent too on the means and tools available in the time-space frame, the "now" and the "here" of the situation. They are the tools of the bricoleur. The unexpected situation can propose itself "outside of the agent's involvement"; something happens which is outside of the agent's control. The experience of being out of control brings ambiguous reactions to the fore, stretching a continuum of actions between extremes: to ignore, withdraw, conform, attune, adapt, recognize, engage, solve, escape, rebel. These different responses depend upon the position of the actor in the situation; upon his or her character and upon his or her belief system and habitus. The agent can be totally involved in that situation, can be on its periphery, or can be outside of it, like a spectator. This position will both determine the possible impact of the unexpectedness upon the agent and his or her intervention in it. The agent can choose to recognize it or to ignore it, to intervene or to be passive. Intervention will be more probable when the agent is involved "in" the situation, but one can be outside and still decide to intervene. For example, seeing somebody being robbed at the other side of the road, I can start screaming but, not really being involved, I could also refrain from any action. Such a responsive improvisation is very demanding: an exercise in survival, an exercise of a dialogical nature. In everyday life unexpected situations can be negatively experienced, and responding to them can be exhausting. Fear of failure is part of the leap into the unknown, but the unknown is unavoidable. The "out of control" implies a fear of the unknown, as we are even not sure of gaining control through our improvisatory actions. Humans are not inherently heroes, being often paralyzed or very clumsy in unexpected situations, as Smith remarks. However, they have a resilience, a capacity to recover quickly from dreadful situations. They engage with, even merge, in the situation, as the situation becomes a flow of the here, the now, and the "I." It is a flow, a transitional experience in which the self is absorbed in the situation, merging one's own awareness into what happens. The categories of identity and materiality, action and reaction, positive and negative disappear in favor of the now and the here. In these situations, our acts are never our entire property. The "I" finds itself on shifting grounds as it is moved by something that disturbs an identity that is more or less unquestioned in safer situations.
Expected unexpectedness in artistic improvisation: between tactics and strategies
The time of doing must be instituted so as to contain singularities that are not determinable in advance, as the possibility of appearance of what is irregular […] [I]t must preserve or make room for the emergence of otherness. (Castoriadis 372) Heroes encounter the same fear of danger, risk, and failure, but they are part of a one-act play, of which they are the centre, even if the unexpected happens on the periphery. Moreover, they expect the unexpected to happen and know they will have to be cunning and use tricks and tactics. Gilgamesh and Odysseus all centre on a quest. Odysseus is known for using incredible tactics and tricks to save his life time after time. He can escape from Cyclops's cave by his improvisational skill in interactions, fooling the Cyclops and telling them that he is Nobody. A high level of understanding how to do or say the right thing, at the right moment, saves lives and helps to achieve goals.
For the Greeks, different contexts, aims, trajectories, and situations require time and again new choices, decisions, and ad hoc reflection. Choices can never be settled, can never rest on facts and principles. While these multiple choices are ephemeral, they are fundamental in coping with the complexity of life and the world. As such, the right decisions and choices, actions and commitments have to be made at the right moment, at the opportune time, the kairos. The "here," the "now," and the "I" merge in kairos, and out of this kairos-time "emerges" something new. Once made, the choices are irreversible and will lead to further, other moments of kairos in which to act and intervene. 5 The invention of the hero and the action in the moment of kairos refer to the human need to sublimate interaction in unexpected events. Artists bring both notions together in the art of improvisation. While improvisation in life is defined by its inherent unexpectedness, in the arts the unexpected is searched for. It is "expected unexpectedness." Artistic improvisatory acts bring expert habitus, bricolage, and tactics together in moments of kairos.
On the one hand, artistic action plays in the now and the here-no revision, no reprise, no hesitations. One holistic process unfolds in time and space, each gesture being the result of the previous and the origin of the next, each gesture adding, changing, influencing the meaning of what was before and what is to come in a dialogue with the whole now and here. Artistic improvisation time is fleeting and constraining; movements unfold, succeed, and even silence or immobility is but a tension or preparation of the embodied, bound for the next movement or sound. Nothing is ever in isolation. It resembles human improvisation. The musician Frederic Rzewski addresses the unexpected problem or failure in his Nonsequiturs, where he mentions that improvisation is the act of intervening upon "an error, a wrong note, a fumble" (52), and transforming it into something which is no longer wrong, but transcends into the sublime: "great improvisation […] exploits the fantasy of the mere human who, godlike, defies the limits imposed by nature, flying over the heads of the audience" (106).
On the other hand, like the hero, the improvising artist knows he/she will have to cope with unexpected situations. The broad trajectory and the time-space frame is largely known in advance, at least in form, if not in content. Like the hero, the artist will prepare him/herself for unexpectedness.
While improvisation in art is not totally unexpected, it is also not completely free. It strives for new expression and construction using intuition, but requires also skill and tacit rules within the community of improvisers (Wallace 7). For example, music improvisers will set up a situation in which the environment and techniques concerning materials, conditions, and expectations allow for improvisational practices. Such a situation is backed up by the personal expertise and skill of the improvisers, artistic habitus, as well as what the community recognizes as music improvisation. The musician will not have to react in a totally unprepared way. He/she will have developed, in advance, strategies-well-defined methods of tackling unexpected situations, of coping with constant change and intervention within a predetermined structure. He or she can, over time, "practice" improvisation and will generate a certain skill or language of improvisation. Tactical ways of responding in the moment will be sustained by a bundle of strategies, long-lasting flexible frames for coping with "unexpectedness" in an improvisation.
Indeed, while in everyday life improvisation is an often unintended act of doing, a leap into the unknown, where agency precedes intentionality, the artist will try to synchronize intention and action, and even, by relying upon a concept of doing, put intentionality before agency. Common patterns of behaving and thinking, talking and doing, will be completed by an expert habitus which contains strategies for improvisation. Such a habitus combines embodied schemata with artistic expert know-how concerning cultural, technical, embodied, and material conditions and contexts. The expert habitus structures perception, thought, action, and communication, and can be adapted and re-coordinated in specific situations. 6 Improvisatory situations then are met by a performance practice that relies upon the dynamic strategies, languages, and techniques of improvisers, inside a broader shared context.
Conclusion
Improvisation […] is not the province of music or any other performing art alone. It is both an aesthetic practice and a life practice, and [...] it can-when practiced or studied-aid both aesthetics specifically and survival in general. (Wallace 153) Two main threads on improvisation have been woven through this text. The first one is that of unexpectedness as one of the main motivations for improvisational actions. Improvisation is seen as a kind of unanticipated action that emerges out of unexpected events. These events can be considered along a continuous line between unexpected unexpectedness and expected unexpectedness. Both are theoretical extremes. The second thread is the extension of these actions from everyday life to artistic practices, pointing to the human condition and the aspiration of human beings to the conditions of gods and heroes.
Two limitations of this endeavor should be recognised.
Firstly, the focus in this article is mainly on the obligatory, disturbing aspects of unexpectedness in everyday life, where improvisation becomes a matter of necessity and even survival. As such, the playful side of an improvisational attitude, which children often display, as well as the tactics of improvisation that emerge out of this as positive, self-enriching acts, have largely been omitted and are only briefly mentioned in the context of qualitative aspects of unexpectedness. While this omission is important to note, the place and time of this article does not allow for a fuller development of these aspects.
Secondly, and following from this first remark, the development of improvisational skill is not unique to musicians or artists. Everyone can learn from unexpected situations. While artists have developed an "art of improvisation," the recurrence of situations allowing for improvisational actions in everyday life can also lead to the development of specific "everyday" improvisational languages or skills. As such, an improviser, not only in art but also in life, can acquire over time flexible strategies of improvisation.
Experience and knowledge enhance ways to cope with unexpectedness and to "improvise" better. In art, a mastery of "gesture" reveals itself in improvisatory acts, using expert habitus in kairos, the moment of now. This allows the artist to realize a complex aesthetic output, linking on a high qualitative level embodied patterns of expression, signification, and interpretation in the moment. In everyday life, becoming aware of the richness and power of improvisational acts, and developing an improvisational attitude, can also enhance and enrich confrontations with unexpectedness.
